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ARTICLES
FINDING SHADE FROM THE "GOVERNMENT IN
THE SUNSHINE ACT": A PROPOSAL TO PERMIT
PRIVATE INFORMAL BACKGROUND




A fundamental principle of the American legal system is that the free
and open exchange of ideas is encouraged and protected.1 To this end,
decisionmakers should have the benefit of considering and debating all
relevant evidence before rendering a final decision. However, this funda-
mental principle is not observed at the United States International Trade
Commission ("ITC" or "Commission") 2 when it considers antidumping
* Associate Professor, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University.
1. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes:
Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1362 (1990)
(explaining that within the United States constitutional system, a full and open exchange,
debate, or inquiry of all relevant information allows for the "resolution of disputes in the
marketplace of ideas"). Courts have long extolled the virtues of full and open exchanges
of information. In the seminal First Amendment case of Abrams v. United States, Justice
Holmes stated:
[People] may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. The ITC is an independent, quasi-judicial body comprised of six Commissioners
who are appointed by the President, but are not accountable to the executive branch. The
Commissioners serve for a term of nine years each, and no more than three of the Com-
missioners may belong to the same political party. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a), (b) (1994). In
addition to the Commissioners, the ITC consists of commodity specialists, accountants,
economists, and attorneys who gather facts and prepare reports for the Commissioners'
use. THOMAS V. VAKERICS ET AL., ANTIDUMPING, COUNTERVAILING DUTY, AND OTHER
TRADE ACTIONS 7 (1987); see also U.S. Irrr'L TRADE COMM'N ANN. REP. 5 (1993) (briefly
discussing the ITC's responsibilities and appointment process).
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and countervailing duty ("AD/CVD") cases.3 The Administrative Con-
ference of the United States noted in a 1991 Report and Recommenda-
tion that "[t]he Commissioners of the ITC apparently do not normally
meet as a group to discuss their views of a case before their formal delib-
erations."4 Moreover, the Commissioners apparently do not share any
written opinions among themselves.5 Honorable Anne Brunsdale, a for-
mer Acting Chair of the Commission, expressed her concern when she
wrote:
Of course, in light of the Commission's practice of voting the
week before opinions are due and then not sharing opinions-
not even the opinion drafted by the General Counsel for the
plurality-before they are released, I do not have the benefit of
my colleagues' views on the central issues in [the] case. I there-
3. The AD/CVD laws impose dumping or subsidization duties on foreign goods sold
in the United States at less than fair value when a U.S. industry is "materially injured or ...
[is] threatened with material injury" by reason of those sales. See VAKERICS, supra note 2,
at 6; 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a, 1673a (1994). AD/CVD cases are initiated when an interested
party files a petition on behalf of a U.S. industry (such as a domestic manufacturer or a
trade association who manufactures, produces, or wholesales a like product in the United
States). 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(a)(9), 1671a(b)(1), 1673a (defining interested party and the pro-
cedures for initiating an AD/CVD investigation).
Under 19 U.S.C. § 1673a, the procedure for instituting an antidumping duty investiga-
tion, two separate U.S. government entities are responsible for different aspects of the
investigation. Michael A. Lawrence, Bias in the International Trade Administration: The
Need for Impartial Decisionmakers in United States Antidumping Proceedings, 26 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 5-7 (1994). The two entities are the International Trade Administra-
tion's Import Association ("ITA") and the International Trade Commission ("ITC"). Id.
at 5. The ITA is responsible for investigating and determining whether there are sales of
foreign goods in the United States occurring at less-than-fair-value. Id. The responsibili-
ties of the ITC include investigating and determining "whether those sales actually caused,
or threatened to cause, material injury to U.S. industry." Id.; see UNITED STATES INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY HANDBOOK
II-1 to 11-22 (1994) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (detailing the investigation process regarding
AD/CVD cases).
4. Administrative Procedures Used in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases
(Recommendation No. 91-10), 56 Fed. Reg. 67,144, 67,144-45 (1991) [hereinafter Recom-
mendation]. The Administrative Conference is an independent federal agency that con-
ducts research, issues reports, and makes recommendations to the President, Congress,
particular departments and agencies, and the judiciary regarding the need for procedural
reforms in federal agencies. JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: REFORM OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURES USED IN U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES, frontispiece
(1991). Conference recommendations may be implemented directly by the affected agen-
cies or through legislative action. Id. The Administrative Conference ceased operations
on October 31, 1995 due to a termination of funding by Congress. Memorandum from
Jeffrey Lubbers, Admin. Conf. Research Director, to Interested Persons, October 12, 1995.
5. See infra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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fore do not know whether their arguments might have swayed
me .
6
Former ITC Commissioner Alfred Eckes also expressed his own and
other commissioners' frustration regarding the lack of access to the views
of other Commissioners.7 Judge Carman of the Court of International
Trade, the reviewing court for the ITC, expressed his great frustration
with the Commissioners' practice of not sharing opinions and information
among themselves, and stated that "this court expresses the hope that this
practice will come to an end."8 Judge Carman averred that the ITC's
practice was particularly frustrating in light of the great weight that the
court is required to give to the agency's decisions.9
The inescapable conclusion drawn from the comments of the Adminis-
trative Conference, the ITC Commissioners, and the Court of Interna-
tional Trade is that aside from the formal hearing and the final vote, 10
there are effectively no discussions or exchanges of information among
the Commissioners in AD/CVD cases.
The Commission's practice of denying itself the full benefit of a broad
spectrum of views and insights regarding AD/CVD cases is antithetical to
the notion that decisionmakers, and the decisionmaking process, benefit
from a full and open exchange of information. The Commission's prac-
tice is at once shortsighted and patently anti-intellectual." Given the
6. Coated Groundwood Paper from Austria, et al., USITC Pub. 2359, 1991 ITC
LEXIS 100, at *79 n.7 (Feb. 1991). Similarly, Commissioner Liebeler noted:
Because we have not seen the majority opinion, our references to the majority's
views are, at best, educated guesses. It is very difficult to write a dissenting opin-
ion without seeing the majority opinion. Unfortunately, Commission practice of
the last several years has been not to circulate opinions .... In our view, the lack
of opinion-sharing at the Commission leads to inadequate, if any, joining of is-
sues. The parties, the public, and the reputation of the Commission all suffer as a
result.
In the Matter of Certain Unitary Electromagnetic Flowmeters with Sealed Coils, USITC
Pub. 1924, 1986 ITC LEXIS 234, at *36 n.1 (Nov. 1986) (emphasis added).
7. Certain Telephone Systems and Subassemblies Thereof from Korea, USITC Pub.
2254, 1990 ITC LEXIS 44, at *21 n.10 (Jan. 1990) (stating that the investigation was pre-
pared without the benefit of the other Commissioners' views); Mechanical Transfer Presses
from Japan, USITC Pub. 2257, 1990 ITC LEXIS 36, at *49 n.l (Feb. 1990); Drafting Ma-
chines and Parts Thereof From Japan, USITC No. 2247, 1989 ITC LEXIS 412, at *77 n.7
(Dec. 1989).
8. Borlem S.A. Empreedimentos Industialis v. United States, 718 F. Supp. 41, 49 n.4
(Ct. Int'l Trade), app. granted, 892 F.2d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 1989), and count dismissed, 782 F.
Supp. 1031 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992) (discussing the ITC's authority to reconsider an affirma-
tive threat of injury determination remanded from the Court of International Trade).
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing informal meetings).
11. Indeed, trade law practitioners regard the Commission's absence of informal back-
ground discussions during the AD/CVD process as an impediment to the ITC's effective-
1995]
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enormous economic interests at stake in AD/CVD proceedings, it is no
exaggeration to assert that the Commission's practice harms, in the larg-
est sense, the national interests of the United States.12 Such a practice
also economically damages foreign and domestic companies and, ulti-
mately, United States consumers. 3 The ITC, by denying itself a substan-
tial portion of the resources available in AD/CVD cases-namely, access
to cases and the knowledge and insights of the other individual Commis-
sioners-produces decisions that are less cogent and fair than they could
and should be.' 4
The apparent reason for the Commission's practice of declining to en-
gage in formal background discussions at any point of the AD/CVD pro-
cess is its desire not to violate the Government in the Sunshine Act
ness in fairly deciding AD/CVD cases. Recommendation, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,144, 67,145
(stating that "the Commission's reluctance to meet as a group adversely affects the ITC
decisionmaking process.")
12. See HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 111-7. AD/CVD cases have a great domestic and
foreign impact on individual companies and markets. The ITC calculated that AD/CVD
cases at the ITC during 1980-93 involved nearly $34 billion in imports from countries sub-
ject to investigation. Id. Theoretically, the continued existence and viability of whole mar-
kets and industries can hinge on the outcome of an individual AD/CVD case.
ITC Commissioner Don Newquist stated in a 1992 letter to the editor of the New York
Times that, "[d]umped imports that undersell United States products even slightly can lead
to declines in production and market share, reduced cash flows, cutbacks in R.& D., and
disinvestment, not to mention employee layoffs and plant closings .... United States an-
tidumping laws help to preserve our national manufacturing, technology and tax base ......
Don E. Newquist, Letter to the Editor, The Uses of Anti-Dumping Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1992, § 3, at 9. Further, F. Amanda DeBusk stated that the current enforcement prac-
tices of U.S. trade laws become "retaliatory clubs" that spawn similar retaliatory actions in
other countries, thereby threatening global free trade. F. Amanda DeBusk, Dumping
Laws Still Endanger the Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, § 3, at 13.
13. In its most recent annual report to Congress, the Council of Economic Advisers
asserted that import barriers, such as antidumping and countervailing duty statutes, gener-
ally increase the cost of a good, and that increased cost is then disbursed on and burdens
the rest of the economy. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, THE ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS 252 (1995) [hereinafter ECON. ADVISERS RE-
PORT]. The Council estimated that the total consumer costs of U.S. tariff and nontariff
barriers may be as high as $70 billion per year. Id. Further, because protection usually "is
applied to 'cheap goods' or to consumer staples such as clothing and food products," the
increased costs fall primarily on the poor. Id.
As Commissioner Newquist asserted, U.S. trade laws "enable millions of Americans to
earn a good living and then reinvest those earnings as consumers." Newquist, supra note
12, at 9. Therefore, if U.S. trade laws are being administered in a manner that is less than
optimal, these "millions of Americans" are directly and adversely affected. Id.
14. It is unrealistic to expect each individual Commissioner to fully understand every
nuance of each AD/CVD case, because each case can be substantively and procedurally
complex. Although each Commissioner has access to various staff analysts and experts to
assist in gathering facts and data, a vital link in the decisionmaking process is missing be-
cause he or she does not have the opportunity informally to clarify issues or exchange
varying views with his or her colleagues.
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("Sunshine Act" or "Act").15 The Act specifies that every agency meet-
ing must be open to the public unless the meeting falls within a delineated
exception. 6 Although nothing under the ITC's current procedures pro-
hibits the Commissioners from meeting publicly to exchange information
regarding pending AD/CVD cases, they choose, for whatever reason, not
to do so. 17
This Article argues that the Sunshine Act does not apply to informal
background discussions that clarify issues and expose varying views, and
therefore should not prevent the ITC Commissioners from engaging in
such informed discussions regarding AD/CVD cases. Following a de-
scription of the Sunshine Act legislation, this Article examines the Act as
it applies specifically to the Commission's AD/CVD proceedings. This
Article then concludes that the language and legislative history of the Act
itself, coupled with highly persuasive United States Supreme Court au-
thority, strongly suggest that such informal background discussions by the
Commissioners do not fall within the Sunshine Act's definition of
"meeting."
Further, this Article contends that even if such private, informal ex-
changes of information and views do constitute "meetings" under the
Sunshine Act, such meetings fall within the exemptions provided under
the Act in § 552b(c)(10) ("Exemption 10"). By finding that such meet-
15. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b), (h) (1994). In a recommen-
dation to Congress, the Administrative Conference stated that the Commissioners of the
ITC do not usually meet as a group to discuss AD/CVD cases because of their concerns of
violating the Sunshine Act. 56 Fed. Reg. 67,144, 67,145; see, e.g., JACKSON & DAVEY,
supra note 4, at 46.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b). The exemptions are laid out in § 552b(c)(1-10).
17. See id. The very language of the Act specifically states that "every meeting of an
agency shall be open to public observation," which may explain in part why the ITC
chooses not to meet publicly. Id. (emphasis added). In a 1984 report to the Administra-
tive Conference discussing the effects of the Sunshine Act on government agencies, the
report's authors noted that government "officials in positions of responsibility, generally
do not wish to appear unknowledgeable, uncertain, or unprincipled ...." DAVID M. WEL-
BORN, ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE
SUNSHINE ACT: FINAL REPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 84 (1984) [hereinafter WELBORN REPORT] (available at United States Administra-
tive Conference); see infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text (discussing the negative
effects of the Sunshine Act on agency decisionmakers.); see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1975) (illustrating Senate and lower court concerns regarding
the detrimental effects on an agency's decisionmaker and the decisionmaking process when
the agency's meetings are open to the public).
By compounding the natural human impulses of agency decisionmakers to appear confi-
dent and knowledgeable with the high stakes involved in AD/CVD cases, a plausible ex-
planation for the ITC Commissioners' reluctance to meet in a public forum is self evident.
See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (discussing the high stakes involved in AD/
CVD cases).
19951
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ings fall under Exemption 10, the ITC could close its meetings and fully
benefit from each and every Commissioner's views. 8 Finally, this Article
will restate and summarize the arguments and emphasize their impor-
tance in the context of improving the ITC's effectiveness in its handling of
AD/CVD cases.
II. THE SUNSHINE Acr LEGISLATION
The Sunshine Act 9 specifies that, with certain exceptions, "every por-
tion of every meeting of an agency shall be open to public observation., 20
The Act is based on the declared policy that "the public is entitled to the
fullest practicable information regarding the decisionmaking processes of
the Federal Government.",2' The purpose of the Act is to give the public
access to agency information, protect the rights of individuals, and allow
the Government to carry out its responsibilities.22
The Act sets forth specific procedural guidelines for agencies to follow
regarding the holding and closing of meetings.23 For example, the agency
must publicly announce, at least one week in advance, the meeting's time
and place and the subject matter to be discussed. 24 Agencies, however,
may decide to close meetings or withhold information about meetings.25
Closing a meeting is done only when a majority of the entire membership
of the agency votes to do so.26 If a meeting is closed, the agency must
18. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10) (showing that by falling under Exemption 10, the Com-
missioners could hold closed discussions with one another in an effort to reach the wisest
decisions).
19. Id. § 552b.
20. Id. § 552b(b).
21. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 2, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
22. Id. Whether the Sunshine Act in fact has been successful in achieving its stated
purpose is a subject of spirited debate. See infra notes 45-65 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the current debate surrounding the effectiveness of the Sunshine Act).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)-(f) (detailing at length when a meeting may be closed and what
procedures an agency must follow before and after closing a meeting).
24. Id. § 552b(e)(1). The agency must also designate the name and phone number of
the official responsible for responding to requests for information about the meeting. Id.
25. The agency may close meetings or withhold information about meetings pursuant
to an appropriate exemption provided in 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c). See infra notes 39-44 and
accompanying text (analyzing the exemptions to the Sunshine Act's open meeting
requirement).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(d)(1). The agency members take a separate vote each time they
propose to close or withhold information about a meeting pursuant to one of the subsec-
tion (c) exemptions. Id. Within one day of any vote to close or withhold information
regarding a public meeting, the agency must make available to the public a written copy of
the vote of each member. Id. § 552b(d)(3). If any portion of a meeting is to be closed, the
agency nust make available a full written explanation of the closing, coupled with a list of
all persons, and their affiliation, expected to attend the meeting. Id.
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maintain a complete transcript, recording, or set of minutes of the
meeting.27
A. The Act's Reach: Determining What Constitutes a "Meeting" for
Sunshine Act Purposes
The Sunshine Act's scope is restricted to activities that constitute a
"meeting" under the Act. 28 Determining the true meaning of the term
"meeting" is probably "the most troublesome [aspect] ... in interpreting
and applying the Sunshine Act.",29 The Act itself specifically defines a
"meeting" as the "deliberations of at least the number of individual
agency members required to take action on behalf of the agency where
such deliberations determine or result in the joint conduct or disposition
of official agency business. '"30
In dissecting the definition of "meeting" under the Act, it is important
to consider several distinct points. First, the number of agency members
present must constitute a quorum for the gathering to be considered a
"meeting."31 Second, the members present must, at a minimum, "be po-
tentially involved in the discussion."'3 2 Third, the meeting must constitute
"deliberations [which] determine or result in ... joint conduct or disposi-
tion of official agency business."33 This last phrase is particularly prob-
27. Id. § 552b(f)(1). This transcript, recording, or set of minutes shall be made
promptly available, in an easily accessible place, to the public. Id. § 552b(f)(2).
28. See id. § 552b(b) (specifically stating that every governmental agency meeting
must be open to the public); Id. § 552b(a)(2) (defining the term "meeting"); see also infra
notes 30-38 and accompanying text (analyzing the definition of the term "meeting" under
the Act).
29. RICHARD K. BERG AND STEPHEN H. KLITZMAN, AN INTERPRETIVE GUIDE TO THE
GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE AcT, 3 (1978) (stating that to define "meeting" creates
perplexing interpretation and application problems regarding the Sunshine Act); see, e.g.,
Larry W. Thomas, The Courts and the Implementation of the Government in the Sunshine
Act, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 259, 262 (1985).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2). The Act specifically defines the term "agency" as "any
agency ... headed by a collegial body composed of two or more individual members, a
majority of whom are appointed to such position by the President... and any subdivision
thereof authorized to act on behalf of the agency." Id. § 552b(a)(1). Furthermore, the Act
defines "member" as "an individual who belongs to a collegial body heading an agency."
Id. § 552b(a)(3).
31. S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975) (illustrating what constitutes a
quorum under different situations). A gathering of less than a quorum will never consti-
tute a "meeting" as defined by the Sunshine Act. Id. at 2-3.
32. Id. at 18. See also BERG AND KLITZMAN, supra note 29, at 4-5 (further developing
the definition of "meeting" in that a Commissioner's physical presence is not required, as a
conference call could constitute a meeting).
33. BERG AND KLITZMAN, supra note 29, at 5. An analysis of the various issues raised
in interpreting this phrase is discussed in detail in Section III, infra. The Senate Report
states that the inclusion of the word "joint" is meant to exclude situations where agency
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lematic due to the ambiguity of the definitions of "deliberations",
"conduct",34 and the phrase "determine or result in."35 Finally, in at-
tempting to interpret the meaning of the term "meeting", one is left with
the question of what constitutes "official agency business., 36
With respect to the types of discussions that will fall under the Sun-
shine Act's open meeting requirement, one influential authority distin-
guished between meetings where the focus is on discrete proposals or
issues, and meetings where discussions are more informational and ex-
ploratory.37 This authority concludes that in informational meetings,
members would be less inclined to cultivate firm positions on issues that
will come before the agency.38
B. Exemptions from the Act's Open Meeting Requirement
Despite its seemingly broad scope, the Sunshine Act offers a number of
exemptions from its open meeting requirement.39 The exemptions cover
members may be in the audience while another agency member gives a speech concerning
agency business. S. Rep. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1975).
34. See infra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of the terms "de-
liberation" and "conduct").
35. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of the
phrase "determine or result in").
36. See infra notes 98-100, 104-08 (discussing the interpretation of the phrase "official
agency business").
37. BERG AND KLITZMAN, supra note 29, at 9.
38. Id.
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1-10)(1994). Specifically, the Act allows an agency to close
meetings when the agency determines that the meeting or the disclosure of information
during the meeting is likely to:
(1) disclose matters... of national defense or foreign policy... ; (2) relate solely
to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; (3) disclose matters
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ... ; (4) disclose trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential; (5) involve accusing any person of a crime, or formally censuring any
person; (6) disclose information of a personal nature where disclosure would con-
stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (7) disclose [certain]
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes ... ; (8) disclose
information contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition re-
ports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; (9) disclose information the
premature disclosure of which would ... be likely to (i) lead to significant finan-
cial speculation . . . or (ii) significantly endanger the stability of any financial
institution; or ... to significantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency
action ... ; or (10) specifically concern the agency's issuance of a subpoena or the
agency's participation in a civil action or proceeding, . . . or disposition by the
agency of a particular case of formal agency adjudication pursuant to the proce-
dures in section 554 of [Title 5 of the U.S. Code] or otherwise involving a determi-
nation on the record after opportunity for a hearing.
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meetings where issues of national security or internal agency rules are
involved, or where the disclosure of the contents of the meeting would
result in an invasion of an individual's personal privacy.40 Furthermore,
some exceptions delineated under the Act relate to law enforcement
issues.41
Although the Act carves out various circumstances where a meeting
would be exempt from the Act's requirements, the Act's legislative his-
tory emphasizes that the use of the exemption is permissive, not
mandatory.42 Indeed, the Act specifies that any given meeting should be
open "[e]xcept in a case where the agency finds that the public interest
requires otherwise., 43 Therefore, before an agency closes a meeting, it
must make two determinations: first, the meeting must fall under a statu-
torily mandated exemption, and second, the public interest must require
that the meeting be closed.44
C. The Debate Over the Effectiveness of the Sunshine Act
Whether the Sunshine Act improves government accountability and
openness is a matter of spirited debate. Some proponents argue that the
openness of agency meetings allows the public to more clearly understand
how the governmental decisionmaking process operates, thereby leading
to a greater opportunity for public involvement in the process through
enlightened voting and lobbying.45 The result of an open meetings stat-
40. Id. § 552b(c)(1,2,6).
41. Id. § 552b(c)(7).
42. S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1975).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c).
44. For example, the ITC regulations require that:
(1) When the Commission has determined that one or more of the specific [ex-
emptions apply] .... the Commission shall consider whether or not the public
interest requires that such portion or portions of the meeting be open to public
observation.
(2) In making the public-interest determination ... the Commission shall con-
sider whether public disclosure would (i) Interfere with the Commission's carry-
ing out its statutory responsibilities, (ii) Conflict with the individual right of
privacy under the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a), or (iii) Place the Com-
mission in violation of any other applicable provision of law, in addition to any
other factors which it deems to be relevant to the particular meeting in question.
Regulations of the United States International Trade Commission 19 C.F.R.
§ 201.36(c)(1995); see also BERG AND KLrrZMAN, supra note 29, at 17 (discussing § 552b(c)
grounds for closing meetings to the public).
45. David A. Barrett, Note, Facilitating Government Decision Making: Distinguishing
Between Meetings and Nonmeetings Under The Federal Sunshine Act, 66 TEX. L. REv.
1195, 1195-96 (1988) (citing David Cohen, Openness Works - Let's Get on with It, 38 FED.
B.J. 99, 99-100 (1979)). There is no shortage of hyperbole in such arguments. For exam-
ple, one commentator stated that arguments against the Sunshine Act are "arguments
against democracy." Hearings on S. 260 before the SUBCOMMITrEE ON REORGANIZA-
1995]
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ute on the affected agencies is that officials are inclined to diligently pre-
pare for their meetings thereby leading to better informed
decisionmaking and increased public confidence in the government.46
Furthermore, proponents argue that by holding open meetings, the gov-
ernment is forced to be more responsive to the needs of the general pub-
lic as opposed to submitting to the demands of special interest groups.47
Further, such increased accountability decreases the likelihood of deals
being made "in the dark."48
Not all commentary analyzing the Sunshine Act is positive, however.
Thomas Tucker, former Assistant General Counsel at the FTC, described
the Act as "neither an absolute principle nor a cure-all for the problems
which face us, but rather a largely ineffective and unnecessary informa-
tional policy" with serious detrimental costs.49 Tucker conducted a study
TION, RESEARCH, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON Gov-
ERNMENT OPERATIONS, GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE, RESPONSES TO SUBCOMMITTEE
QUESTIONNAIRE 93 CONG., 1ST SESS. 54 (1973) [hereinafter QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES]
(July 24, 1973 letter from Fred R. Harris to Senators Abe Ribicoff and Lawton Chiles
supporting open meetings of all Congressional Committees). Another commentator de-
scribed the choice between open and closed meetings as a "choice between complete, accu-
rate, and honest reports of a proceeding and distorted, inaccurate, hearsay reports of a
proceeding." JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 22 (1964).
46. Jennifer A. Bensch, Seventeen Years Later: Has Government Let the Sun Shine In?,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1475, 1485 (1993) (citing Thomas H. Tucker, "Sunshine" - The
Dubious New God, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 544 (1980)); see also Barrett, supra note 45, at
1196-97 (stating that "[t]he public's watchful eye might promote a higher rate of attend-
ance at meetings, improve planning of meetings, and encourage more thorough prepara-
tion and more complete discussion of issues by participating officials") (footnote omitted);
Susan T. Stephenson, Comment, Government in the Sunshine Act: Opening Federal Agency
Meetings, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 154, 156-59 (1976) (discussing the idea that public knowledge
is essential to the democratic decisionmaking process).
47. Barrett, supra note 45, at 1196 (citing 121 CONG. REC. 35322 (1975) (statement of
Sen. Ribicoff); Jerry W. Markham, Sunshine on the Administrative Process: Wherein Lies
the Shade?, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 465 (1976) (stating that public scrutiny may prevent
the favoring of special interest groups).
48. Barrett, supra note 45, at 1196 (citing Cohen, supra note 45, at 186 and QUESTION-
NAIRE RESPONSES, supra note 45, at 51 (stating that "[c]itizens cannot hold government
officials accountable - if they do not know what government officials are doing ....");
Harlan Cleveland, The Costs and Benefits of Openness: Sunshine Laws and Higher Educa-
tion, 12 J.C. & U.L. 127, 145-46 (1985)).
49. Tucker, supra note 46, at 550. Tucker warns that the "emotional satisfaction" of
forcing government leaders to conduct their affairs in public must be balanced against the
Sunshine Act's detrimental effects on the government's ability to operate effectively. Id.
Specifically, the author states that "[s]unshine may be a great disinfectant but it is also a
desiccant and can cause sunburn and heat prostration." Id.
The author takes exception to the Senate Report's comment that " 'contemporary argu-
ments by commentators in opposition to such [open meeting] laws are virtually nonexis-
tent.' " Id. at 538 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 8 (1975)). To the
contrary, extensive critical comment was had at the time. Id. at 538 n.4. According to
Tucker, any perceived absence of critical comment at the time might have resulted from
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in which he sent questionnaires to officials of the major regulatory agen-
cies asking about their operational experiences under the Sunshine Act
during the four years following its enactment, 50 and found that a majority
of respondents believed that the presence of the press and public under
open meeting statutes subtly inhibit the free exchange of ideas and
opinions.51
Similarly, in a 1984 report to the Administrative Conference,52 Profes-
sors David Welborn, William Lyons, and Larry Thomas concluded that
the Act led to diminished collegiality and increased inhibitions among
agency decisionmakers.53 These increased inhibitions54 have had a direct
adverse effect on the ability of agency decisionmakers to engage in mean-
ingful debate or to examine issues from multiple perspectives.55 Another
"the almost religious sanctity of 'openness' in the political climate of the day rather than to
the absence of real concerns about [the open meetings laws'] impact on the government
decision-making processes." Id. at 538.
50. Id. at 538-39. Specifically, questionnaires were sent to 28 members of 14 agencies,
and responses were received from 18 members of 13 agencies. Id.
51. Id. at 545. Moreover, all but one of the respondents answered that the Sunshine
Act had adversely affected their agency's ability to meet informally to discuss agency busi-
ness. Id. at 547.
52. WELBORN REPORT, supra note 17. The Welborn Report used four sources to
study the effects of the Sunshine Act on Federal Administrative Agencies: "judicial deci-
sions interpreting the act; annual sunshine reports required of agencies for the years 1977
through 1981; mail survey questionnaires; and personal interviews." Id. at 7.
53. Id. at 51-52, 64-65. The lessening of collegiality caused a shift toward compart-
mentalized, individualist processes isolating members from one another. Id.
54. The authors provide examples of the sorts of inhibitions that occur:
Open meetings were often described by respondents in terms suggesting the ab-
sence of meaningful exchanges, such as 'stiff', [sic] 'formal,' 'set pieces,' and
'staged presentations.' Also diminished is the 'kidding around'. . . that can con-
tribute to a productive work climate. There also may be restraint in the content
of what members say . . .[due to] substantive uncertainty and a desire not to
appear uninformed, apprehension or uncertainty about market and political
repercussions, a reluctance to embarrass staff, and fear of tipping the agency's
hand or revealing weak points in a proposed action .... Another form of inhibi-
tion concerns the adjustment of positions or a change in views in the process of
deliberation .... [There are] pressures in support of the maintenance of a posi-
tion after it is announced, even if there is an inclination to alter it. They include
an unwillingness to appear weak, indecisive, or unprincipled.
Id. at 51-52. See, e.g., Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to
Know," 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (1962); Barrett, supra note 45, at 1211; Cleveland,
supra note 48, at 149-51 (discussing four ways in which open meetings alter the decision-
making process).
55. See WELBORN REPORT supra note 17, at 52. Similarly, the Chairman of the Amer-
ican Bar Association's Administrative Law section concluded nearly ten years after the
Sunshine Act's enactment that the Act "may well have diminished the collegial character
of agency decision making, created a reluctance of agency members even to discuss certain
important agency matters, and shifted the decision-making process to one-on-one discus-
sions between members, exchanging views at the staff level, and exchanging views by writ-
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commentator observed that decisionmakers subject to the Sunshine Act's
open meeting requirements may be reluctant to clarify issues while delib-
erating in the presence of an audience, which could lead to underdevel-
oped, poor decisionmaking.56 Concurrently, during open meetings,
participants demonstrate a tendency to simplify, trivialize, and distill
highly complicated matters solely for the benefit of the public." As a
result, a matter's most important issues may not be discussed at all during
these open meetings.58
In NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. ," the Supreme Court clearly recog-
nized the reservations that agency decisionmakers harbor regarding open
meetings. Justice White succinctly stated that " '[h]uman experience
teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may
well temper candor with a concern for appearances ... to the detriment
of the decisionmaking process.' "60 Similarly, in supporting a particular
exemption to the Freedom of Information Act a decade earlier, the
House and Senate Committee reports both noted that "'exchange of
ideas among agency personnel would not be completely frank if they
were forced to 'operate in a fishbowl' and this could have detrimental
effect on government operations.' "61 According to at least one commen-
tator, "this unanimous agreement among all branches of the federal gov-
ernment that publicity inhibits candor and the free exchange of ideas and
that these qualities are important to the effective functioning of the gov-
ten memoranda." William E. Murane, Chairman's Message, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. V, V
(1985). More recently, in February 1995 over one dozen current and former commission-
ers of administrative agencies and representatives of several private organizations wrote a
letter asking the Chair of the Administrative Conference of the United States to review the
effectiveness of the Sunshine Act in light of the adverse effect the Act had had on agency
decisionmaking. SPECIAL COMMITrEE TO REVIEW THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE
ACT, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REFORM OF THE GOVERN-
MENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT 1 (1995) [hereinafter Reform of the Sunshine Act]. According
to the Special Committee report, the letter stated that the Act has " 'a chilling effect' on
the willingness and ability of agency members to engage in collegial deliberations." Id. at
1; see 60 Fed. Reg. 40,342 (1995).
56. See Bensch, supra note 46, at 1485 (citing Stephenson, supra note 46, at 156-59).
Specifically, open and free discussions could be hampered and " 'populist slogans, not fun-
damental principles' could develop" if the public attended agency meetings. Id. (citing
Tucker, supra note 46, at 541).
57. See Barrett, supra note 45, at 1211 (quoting Cleveland, supra note 48, at 148).
Specifically, the " 'most important questions have five or six sides at least' " yet many mat-
ters are "'boilted] ... down to two sides' for the public's benefit." Id.
58. Id. at 1211-12.
59. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
60. Id. at 150-51 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974)) (emphasis
and alterations in original).
61. Tucker, supra note 46, at 546 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1966); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965)).
[Vol. 45:1
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ernment and consequently are worth protecting has been abruptly dis-
carded by [the Sunshine Act]." 62
In response to these concerns, some commentators suggest that Con-
gress amend the Sunshine Act to expand and define explicitly the circum-
stances under which decisionmakers in administrative agencies may meet
beyond the Act's scope.63 Specifically regarding the ITC, the Adminis-
trative Conference concluded that informal meetings regarding AD/
CVD cases should not be controlled by the Sunshine Act,' and that a
congressional amendment to the Tariff Act is necessary to clarify this
65point.
III. THE ITC's OVERLY RESTRICrIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE
SUNSHINE Acr
Congress' purpose in enacting the Sunshine Act was to provide the
public with a complete account of information regarding the federal gov-
ernment's decisionmaking process 66 while safeguarding individual rights
and the duty of the Government to fully carry out its responsibilities.67
As interpreted by the ITC, however, the Act does not in fact allow the
Government [i.e., the ITC] to carry out its responsibilities in an effective
manner. By prohibiting the Commissioners from engaging in informal
background discussions with one another in order to clarify issues and
62. Tucker, supra note 46, at 546.
63. See, e.g., id. at 549-50 (explaining that the Act should be amended to apply solely
to final agency actions).
64. Recommendation, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,144, 67,145 (1991). The Administrative Confer-
ence's Special Committee to Review the Government in the Sunshine Act repeated its
conclusion in an October 10, 1995 proposed Recommendation. The proposed recommen-
dation stated that the ITC "should follow ACUS Recommendation 91-10 and revisit the
issue of whether its adjudications are covered by Exemption 10 of the Act." Reform of the
Sunshine Act, supra note 55, at 6 (footnote omitted); see also JACKSON & DAVEY, supra
note 4, at 46, Professors Jackson and Davey recognize that the ITC's failure to meet pri-
vately in informal background discussions is detrimental to the decision-making process,
and that in order to facilitate intelligent decisionmaking, the ITC should be encouraged to
exchange drafts, opinions, and other related information prior to formal deliberations.
JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 4, at 46. Because the Sunshine Act provides commission-
ers with less than complete access to all available resources, the Act should be amended.
Id.
65. Recommendation, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,144, 67,146 (1991). While a discussion of a pro-
posed congressional amendment to the Sunshine Act or the Tariff Act is beyond the scope
of this Article, this Article contends that any congressionally mandated narrowing of the
Act's scope would improve the ITC's effectiveness in handling AD/CVD cases.
66. Government in the Sunshine Act, § 2, 90 Stat. at 1241 (1976).
67. Id.
HeinOnline -- 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 13 1995-1996
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:1
expose varying views,68 the Act forces the Commissioners to operate in
an informational vacuum.6 9
This isolation among the Commissioners is wholly unnecessary, given
the Sunshine Act's legislative history and the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of relevant portions of the Act.7" In light of this authority, the ITC
should revise its overly restrictive interpretation of the Sunshine Act to
allow the ITC Commissioners to engage in private informal background
discussions that clarify issues and expose varying views.
This change in policy would be extremely beneficial.71 First, it would
encourage Commissioners to meet and discuss AD/CVD cases. 72 Sec-
68. Indeed, the ITC's practice is to not share even written opinions until the decision is
released. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (noting the chilling effect the Sunshine
Act has on agency dialogue).
70. See infra notes 79-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of "meeting").
71. By contrast, the potential risks to the ITC in adopting such a policy change are
relatively low. Even if the ITC did close a discussion among Commissioners that a court
subsequently determined should have been held open, in all likelihood the court simply
would order the ITC to publicize a transcript of the discussion. See Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 684 F.2d 31, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that, in
those circumstances where the agency mistakenly closed a meeting in violation of the Act,
the release of transcripts constitutes a normal remedy rather than more severe invalidation
of the agency's substantive action); see also Common Cause v. Nuclear Regulation
Comm'n, 674 F.2d 921, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (ordering compliance with the open meet-
ing requirement of the Sunshine Act by releasing transcripts of closed meeting to the pub-
lic); Thomas, supra note 29, at 277-78 (supporting the notion that the release of transcripts
is an appropriate remedy for violating the Act). The first sentence of the legislative history
of 5 U.S.C. § 552b(h)(2) states that any federal court holding appropriate jurisdiction may
"inquire into violations by the agency of the requirements of this section and afford such
relief as it deems appropriate." 5 U.S.C. § 552b(h)(2). The conference explained, how-
ever, that it did not intend for federal courts to use their authority "to set aside agency
action taken other than under section 552b solely because of a violation of section 552b in
any case where the violation is unintentional and not prejudicial to the rights of any person
participating in the review proceeding." H.R. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 23
(1976). In addition, "[a]gency action should not be set aside for a violation of section 552b
unless that violation is of a serious nature." Id. (emphasis added).
Because the change in policy that this Article proposes seeks only to allow the ITC
Commissioners to engage in informal background discussions, there is no reason why such
a policy should be prejudicial to the rights of any participant. As long as the ITC is scrupu-
lous in limiting discussions to such matters, it is highly unlikely that the penalty for any
unintentional violation would result in anything other than a requirement to release the
transcripts of the discussions. See id.
72. Under the current open meeting policy the Commissioners do not meet, informally
or formally, to clarify issues or present varying views to educate themselves fully regarding
an AD/CVD case; nor do they share written opinions, even though such meetings are al-
lowable if held pursuant to the Sunshine Act. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
The only times the Commissioners convene under the current policy are at the hearing and
final vote. Telephone Interview with Ruby Dionne, Chief of Docket, International Trade
Commission (Mar. 31, 1995).
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ond, it would allow Commissioners to ask questions, to brainstorm, and
to propose innovative ideas73 without the apprehension that comes with
knowing an unblinking public eye is fixed upon their every move.74
Third, it would place Commissioners in touch with the most valuable re-
source available to aid in the production of well-reasoned, thoughtful,
and fair decisions-the knowledge and insights of their colleagues.
A. Informal Background Discussions Among ITC Commissioners in
AD/CVD Cases Are Not "Meetings" Under the Sunshine Act
or the ITC Regulations
The Sunshine Act requires every portion of any agency meeting to be
open to the public. 75 Therefore, the question of what activities constitute
"meetings" is at the heart of the Sunshine Act,76 and is subject to widely
varying interpretations.77
1. The Supreme Court's Interpretation: Federal Communications
Commission v. ITT World Communications, Inc.
In Federal Communications Commission v. ITT World Communica-
tions, Inc. 78 the United States Supreme Court considered the question of
73. The value of permitting private informal discussions was addressed by the Ameri-
can Bar Association in its testimony before the House Government Operations
Committee:
There is a need for exempting from the legislation chance encounters and infor-
mational and exploratory discussions [including informal and casual work ses-
sions] as long as they do not predetermine agency action .... Outlandish
suggestions come out of those sessions. Hopefully, humorous suggestions come
out of those sessions, but once in a while the brainstorming matters will lead to a
new and creative and important idea.
Government in the Sunshine: Hearings on H.R. 10315 and H.R. 9868 Before a Subcomm. of
the Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1975) (statement of Prof.
Jerre S. Williams, Chairman, Section on Administrative Law, ABA); see also Government
in the Sunshine Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and
Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1977)
(testimony of Richard Berg, Executive Secretary, Admin. Conf. of the United States) (in-
troducing the hotly contested problem concerning the definition of "meeting").
74. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (describing the adverse costs of hav-
ing open meetings).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b) (1994).
76. Id. § 552b(a)(2). The corresponding ITC regulation is substantively identical to
the Act's language, substituting only the references to "agency" with "Commission" or
"Commissioners." 19 C.F.R. § 201.34(a)(1) (1995).
77. The definition of the term "meeting" has been described as one of the Act's most
troublesome provisions. BERG & KLITZMAN, supra note 29, at 3; see supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
78. 466 U.S. 463 (1984).
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what constitutes "meetings" under the Sunshine Act.7 9 The Court noted
that in drafting the Act's definition of "meeting", Congress recognized
that the administrative process cannot effectively be conducted if subject
to constant public scrutiny.8 ° Specifically, " '[i]nformal background dis-
cussions [that] clarify issues and expose varying views' are a necessary
part of an agency's work."'" The procedural requirements of the Act ef-
fectively would prevent such beneficial discussions and "thereby impair
normal agency operations without achieving significant public benefit., 82
The Sunshine Act's application is therefore limited to meetings where, at
a minimum, a quorum of Commissioners meet to conduct or resolve offi-
cial agency business.83
The Court concluded that Congress clearly intended to allow prelimi-
nary discussion among Commissioners,84 and that only those "'delibera-
tions [that] determine or result in the joint conduct or disposition of
official agency business'" shall be subject to the Act's open meeting re-
quirements. 85 The Court observed that the Act's legislative history sug-
gests that the statutory language covered only those "discussions that
'effectively predetermine official action.' "86 These discussions "must be
'sufficiently focused on discrete proposals or issues as to cause or be
likely to cause the individual participating members to form reasonably
79. Id. at 464-65. ITT involved discussions among three members of the FCC Tele-
communications Committee who constituted a quorum and their European and Canadian
counterparts in a "Consultative Process" to facilitate joint planning of telecommunications
facilities through an exchange of information on regulatory policies. Id. at 465, 470.
80. Id. at 469.
81. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975)) (alteration in
original).
82. Id. at 470.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 472. The Court traced the evolution of the statutory language through the
committee process, and concluded that Congress carefully drafted the language to explic-
itly limit the scope of the Sunshine Act:
For example, the Senate substituted the term "deliberations" for the previously
proposed terms - "assembly or simultaneous communication," or "gathering" -
in order to "exclude many discussions which are informal in nature." Similarly,
earlier versions of the Act had applied to any agency discussions that "concer[n]
the joint conduct or disposition of agency business." The Act now applies only to
deliberations that "determine or result in" the conduct of "official agency busi-
ness." The intent of the revision clearly was to permit preliminary discussion
among agency members.
Id. at 470 n.7 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
85. Id. at 471 (quoting S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975)) (alteration in
original).
86. Id.
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firm positions regarding matters pending or likely to arise before the
agency.' "87
The Court's language in ITT speaks directly to the ITC. Under its cur-
rent AD/CVD practice, ITC Commissioners do not conduct private infor-
mal background discussions, 88 most likely because they fear that such
meetings may overstep the provisions of the Sunshine Act. 89 Nor do the
Commissioners hold public Sunshine Act meetings aside from the
mandatory hearing and the final vote.9° The Commissioners thus have no
opportunity to engage in "necessary" informal background discussions
which help clarify issues and expose varying views.91 As a result, the
ITC's normal agency operations are impaired without achieving signifi-
cant public benefit.92
2. The Definition of Meeting in The Interpretive Guide
In ITT, the Supreme Court cited prominently to the Interpretive Guide
to the Government in Sunshine Act ("Interpretive Guide"), a United
States Administrative Conference publication. 93 The Interpretive Guide
87. Id. (quoting BERG AND KLrrZMAN, supra note 29, at 9). In ITT the Court noted
that petitioner ITT neither alleged that the FCC Committee formally acted upon a matter
under its authority nor that the gatherings in dispute "resulted infirm positions on particu-
lar matters pending or likely to arise before the Committee." Id. (emphasis added). In
interpreting Congressional intent the Court concluded that the Sunshine Act's purpose was
not to encompass such general background discussions. Id. at 471-72; see Republic Air-
lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 756 F.2d 1304, 1319 (8th Cir. 1985). The "discussions
between Board members and staff and the circulation of memoranda among the Board
members were activities common to any body of responsible public officials preparing to
make an important decision." Id. at 1319. Such activity did not constitute a "meeting"
under the Sunshine Act. Id.
88. See supra notes 4, 68-69 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 15-17, and accompanying text (discussing the lack of privately held
discussions between Commissioners).
90. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 82 and accompanying text; notes 49-65 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the detrimental effects of the lack of private informal discussions).
93. FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 471 (1984) (citing BERG
AND KLITZMAN, supra note 29, at 9). The Berg and Klitzman Interpretive Guide was pre-
pared by the office of the chairman of the Administrative Conference after extensive con-
sultation with agencies that have been affected by the Sunshine Act. Id. at 471 n.10. The
Interpretive Guide was created pursuant to Congressional request and in conjunction with
subsection (g) of the Act, which specifies that the fifty or so agencies subject to the Sun-
shine Act are to promulgate implementing regulations within 180 days of the Act's date of
enactment. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(g) (1994). The Act directs the affected agencies to consult
with the Office of the Chairman of the United States Administrative Conference to assist
in promulgating the required regulations. Id.; see, e.g., BERG AND KLrrZMAN, supra note
29, at v (illustrating the Administrative Conference's purpose and role in drafting the Inter-
pretive Guide); Thomas, supra note 29, at 262 (same). In the process of preparing regula-
tions the authors of the Interpretive Guide conducted meetings with affected agency
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discusses various aspects of the Sunshine Act, including the difficulties of
determining what constitutes a "meeting" under the Act.94
At a minimum, the Interpretive Guide notes that the Act's legislative
history suggests that a "meeting" includes any gathering of the number of
Commissioners required to constitute a quorum, where they engage in a
serious exchange of differing views so as to achieve a consensus on an
issue of official agency business.95 The Interpretive Guide acknowledges,
however, that the task of defining the term "meeting" is an arduous
one.
96
According to the Interpretive Guide, the Senate Report on the Sun-
shine Act indicates that the distinction between discussions "which 'effec-
tively predetermine official actions' and those which do not" is the
controlling principle regarding the meaning of "meeting." 97 The Senate
Report states that for an agency to avoid the Act's open meeting require-
ment, its discussions must remain informal and preliminary and that the
discussions should not effectively predetermine official agency action.98
On the basis of this Senate Report language, the Interpretive Guide con-
tends that "briefings and exploratory or tentative discussions would not
representatives, circulated drafts and related materials from other agencies, supplied com-
ments, both oral and written, attempted to clarify issues for agency representatives, and
served as a "clearing house" for Sunshine Act information. BERG AND KLITZMAN, supra
note 29, at v.
94. BERG AND KLITZMAN, supra note 29, at 3-6 (stating that "much attention was
devoted in the legislative process to attempting to define when conversations among
agency members rise to the level of a 'meeting' ").
95. Id. at 5. The Act specifies that the meeting consist of "deliberations [that] deter-
mine or result in the joint conduct or disposition of official agency business." 5 U.S.C
§ 552b(a)(2) (emphasis added). Interestingly, the Senate Report noted that the terms 'de-
liberation' and 'conduct' were carefully selected to illustrate the necessity that "some de-
gree of formality is required before a gathering is considered a meeting" under the Sunshine
Act. S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1975) (emphasis added); e.g., BERG AND
KLITZMAN, supra note 29, at 6 n.9; ITT, 466 U.S. at 470 n.7.
96. BERG AND KLrrZMAN, supra note 29, at 5-6. The authors of the Interpretive Guide
addressed the difficulty of defining the word "meeting" when they stated:
But what of the intermediate points on the spectrum? [Does the definition in-
clude] [b]riefings to the members by staff or outsiders, which are accompanied by
limited exchanges among the members? Discussions among the members which
are serious but tentative and exploratory, not calculated or intended to lead to an
immediate commitment by the agency to any course of action? Discussions which
attempt to reach but do not achieve a consensus? Given the great variety of
possible fact situations (which the preceding examples suggest but do not ex-
haust), it is hard to articulate a practical test of a "meeting" with any degree of
confidence.
Id. at 6.
97. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1995)).
98. S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975).
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fall within the definition of 'meeting' "99 so long as no official action is
effectively predetermined. 10 0
It is illuminating to compare the Senate Report with the House Com-
mittee on Government Operations Report. The House Committee Re-
port, in discussing its definition of "meeting", stated that agency conduct
regarding decisionmaking is not limited simply to the formal decision-
making or voting, but is intended to include all discussion relating to the
agency's responsibilities.10 ' The contradiction between the Senate Re-
port's "informal and preliminary" language and the House Report's "all
discussion" language supports the view that informal background discus-
sions that clarify issues and expose differing views do not constitute
"meetings" for purposes of the Sunshine Act."0 2 This view is supportable
because the Conference Report definitively stated that the "Senate's defi-
nition of 'meeting' was the basis for the final language" to be imple-
mented in the Act.10 3 Moreover, although both the House and Senate
Reports preliminarily defined 'meeting' specifically as "deliberations...
99. BERG AND KLITZMAN, supra note 29, at 6. Regarding the difficulty of assessing
when an informal discussion evolves into predetermining official agency action, the Inter-
pretive Guide acknowledges that to safeguard itself from violating the Act, an agency may
find it desirable to conduct briefings and exploratory discussions pursuant to the Act's
procedures, even though the briefings and discussions do not technically constitute meet-
ings under the Act. Id. at 10.
The fact that it is inherently difficult to characterize such proceedings helps explain the
ITC's failure to meet privately to conduct informal background discussions. Faced with the
necessity of addressing fine distinctions to determine what may constitute informal discus-
sions as opposed to discussions that may predetermine official agency action, the ITC may
have opted to require that all discussions - formal and informal - be held in compliance
with the provisions of the Sunshine Act. See id. (noting that some agencies will find it
desirable to conduct briefings and exploratory discussions pursuant to the Act's
procedures).
This conservative "risk averse" approach has appealing aspects-if every discussion is held
open to the public, the agency obviously will not have to deal with a challenge that a
particular discussion should have been open. Moreover, a policy requiring that every dis-
cussion be open is easy to administer relative to a policy where fine distinctions would need
to be understood, and determinations made as to which meetings must be open rather than
closed. When blind adherence to a play-it-safe approach prevents an agency from respon-
sibly carrying out its duties in the most effective manner possible, however, the conserva-
tive approach must give way. If a critical, in-depth analysis of the law demonstrates that
certain informal discussions may in fact be closed to public observation, and by doing so
the agency would carry out its responsibilities more effectively, the agency is arguably obli-
gated to hold and to close such discussions, despite the difficulties that the change in policy
may present..
100. Id. at 6.
101. H.R. REP. No. 880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 8 (1976).
102. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
103. S. CoNF. REP. No. 1178, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976) (Conference Report) (em-
phasis added). H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2244, 2247.
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where such deliberations concern the joint conduct or disposition of offi-
cial agency business,"' 0 4 the Conference Report amended the definition
to "deliberations ... where such deliberations determine or result in the
joint conduct or disposition of official agency business .... 5 The Con-
ference Report, however, did not explain why it substituted the phrase
"determine or result in" for the more-inclusive term "concern", 10 6 but the
comments of one Conference committee member are illuminating. He
stated that "[o]n the issue of the definition of a 'meeting', the conference
report accepts the Senate wording except that deliberations would have
to 'determine or result in' the joint conduct or disposition of agency busi-
ness, rather than merely 'concern' such activities."' 07 Specifically, the
change in language was "intended to permit casual discussions between
agency members that might invoke the bill's requirements under the less
formal 'concern' standard."'0 8
On the basis of this legislative history, the Interpretive Guide suggests
that the definition of "meeting" under the Sunshine Act does not include
deliberations concerning agency business that are "so general and tenta-
tive as not to 'determine or result in' the members' adoption of firm posi-
tions regarding future agency action."'1 9 The Interpretive Guide thereby
suggests that informal briefings and exploratory discussions among
agency members might thereby be excluded from the Act's open meeting
requirement. 10
104. S. REP. No. 354, at 18 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 880, at 8 (emphasis ad-
ded). The language in the House bill is almost identical to that in the Senate Conference
Report, except that the word "official" is not found in the House bill. Compare H.R. REP.
No. 880, at 8 with S. REP. No. 354, at 18. The Conference Report, however, does not
explicitly explain why the Senate Report's version, which includes the term "official," ulti-
mately prevailed over the House Report's version. See BERG AND KLITZMAN, supra note
29, at 6-8. The inclusion of the term "official" in the final Conference Report can only be
interpreted as narrowing the type of agency business that would be subject to the Act. Id.
at 7.
105. H.R. CoN. REP. No. 1441, at 2; S. Cor. REP. No. 1178, at 11. The Sunshine Act,
as enacted, contains the Conference Report's "determine or result in" language. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552b(a)(2)(1994). The ITC's regulations mirror the language adopted by the Confer-
ence. See 19 C.F.R. § 201.34(a)(1) (1995) (stating that, "the term meeting means the delib-
erations ... where such deliberations determine or result in the joint conduct or disposition
of official Commission business.").
106. See H.R. Cor'. REP. No. 1441, at 2.
107. 122 CONG. REc. 28, 474 (1976) (statement of Rep. Dante Fascell).
108. Id.
109. BERG AND KLrZMAN, supra note 29, at 7-8.
110. Id. Such reasoning comports with the Senate Report's suggestion that the applica-
ble test is to determine "whether the discussion 'predetermine[s] official action.' " Id. at 8.
The recommendation to exclude informal discussions clearly is appropriate in light of the
practical problems regarding the daily operations of an agency. Id.
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3. The Preference for a Narrow Interpretation of the Definition of
"Meeting"
Other commentators who have considered the language and legislative
history of the Sunshine Act together with the ITT decision, the Interpre-
tive Guide, and other persuasive authority have concluded that certain
discussions among agency officials do not constitute "meetings" under the
Sunshine Act."' One commentator contends that the Supreme Court's
ITT decision clearly mandates that federal courts should narrowly inter-
pret the Act. 1 2 In this commentator's view, the Supreme Court clearly
intended to narrow the scope of the Act when it stated that to be a meet-
ing, " '[i]nformal background discussions [that] clarify issues and expose
varying positions' must be 'sufficiently focused on discrete proposals or
issues' as to 'effectively predetermine official actions.' "13 The commen-
tator concluded that although informal discussions among agency officials
play an important role in policy decisionmaking, such discussions are not
sufficiently related to the determination of official agency action to fall
within the ambit of the Act's definition of meeting."
4
After a comprehensive discussion of the merits and drawbacks of both
the broad and narrow interpretations of "meeting" under the Act, an-
other commentator concluded that a narrow interpretation, whereby ini-
tial pre-deliberative gatherings would not be subject to the Act, is
preferable to a broader interpretation. 115 He reached this conclusion be-
cause a narrow interpretation allows for free exploration of competing
ideas which in turn provides the agency with the maximum number of
options from which to choose the best courses of action." 6 By contrast,
the adoption of the broad view, whereby pre-deliberative gatherings
would be subject to the open meeting requirement of the Act, would sig-
nificantly diminish the quantity and quality of informal exchanges of
views and opinions, thereby adversely affecting the agency decisionmak-
ing process."17
Clearly, parts of the ITC's discussions regarding AD/CVD cases would
fall within the Supreme Court's ITT framework and the Administrative
111. See generally Thomas, supra note 29 (arguing for a narrow interpretation of the
Sunshine Act); Barrett, supra note 45 (same).
112. Thomas, supra note 29, at 279.
113. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466
U.S. 463, 471 (1984)).
114. Id. at 270.
115. Barrett, supra note 45, at 1216 (discussing a more narrow interpretation of the
Sunshine Act to promote informal exchange of ideas and facilitating better agency
decisionmaking).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1209.
19951
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Conference's Interpretive Guide. According to the Supreme Court, pri-
vate informal background discussions held outside of the Act's scope are
necessary to help agency members clarify issues and expose different
opinions and options, thereby allowing the agency to better fulfill its re-
sponsibility of informed decisionmaking." 8 Accordingly, informal dis-
cussions whereby the ITC Commissioners do not formally act upon, or
take firm positions on, the AD/CVD case at issue will not constitute
"meetings" under the Sunshine Act. As long as the ITC's proceedings
remain informal, in that they do not "effectively predetermine official ac-
tions,"119 and the agency's discussions do not cause the individual Com-
missioners "to form reasonably firm positions' 20 regarding pending AD/
CVD cases, the Commission may, and should, engage in beneficial infor-
mal background discussions and utilize all resources to clarify issues, ex-
pose varying views, and formulate complete and cogent decisions. 2'
B. Informal Exchanges of Views, Information, and Drafts Between
ITC Commissioners Regarding AD/CVD Cases Fall Within
the Sunshine Act's Exemption 10
Assuming, arguendo, that informal background discussions among ITC
Commissioners that clarify issues and expose varying views constitute
"meetings" under the Sunshine Act, a careful reading of the statute, cou-
pled with an analysis of persuasive case authority, suggests that such
meetings fall within the ambit of the Sunshine Act's Exemption 10.
Therefore, the ITC would have the power to exempt such "meetings"
from the Act's open meeting requirement. 22
118. ITT, 466 U.S. at 469-70; see supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's examination of the legislative intent and purposes of the Act's open meeting re-
quirements in deciding on a narrow interpretation).
119. ITT, 466 U.S. at 471 (quoting S. REP. No. 354, at 19); see supra notes 97-100 and
accompanying text (discussing Interpretive Guide's interpretation of the Senate Report's
language).
120. ITT, 466 U.S. at 471; see supra notes 84-87, 103-10 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Congressional intent as construed by the ITT Court and interpreted by the Inter-
pretive Guide).
121. Insofar as such a change in policy would create apprehension that the ITC Com-
missioners would somehow abuse their newfound liberty, the ITC could allay those fears
by maintaining minutes of their discussions in a manner similar to that required for meet-
ings closed under one of the Sunshine Act's ten exemptions. See infra note 148 (explaining
procedural guidelines under 5 U.S.C. § 552b(f)(1) (1994)); supra notes 39 and accompany-
ing text (providing the specific language of the Sunshine Act's 10 exemptions).
122. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Moreover, as long as the meeting satis-
fies Exemption 10's requirements, formal meetings could be closed as well. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552b(c).
[Vol. 45:1
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Exemption 10 of the Sunshine Act allows for a meeting to be closed to
the public if it is concerned with one of five specifically delineated catego-
ries, exempting meetings that:
[i] "specifically concern the agency's issuance of a subpena
[sic]"; [ii] "or [that specifically concern ... .] the agency's partici-
pation in a civil action or proceeding, an action in a foreign
court or international tribunal"; [iii] "or [that specifically con-
cern ... ] an arbitration"; [iv] "or [that specifically concern ... ]
the initiation, conduct, or disposition by the agency of a particu-
lar case of formal agency adjudication pursuant to the proce-
dures in § 554 of this title"; [v] "or [that specifically concern...
the initiation, conduct, or disposition by the agency of a particu-
lar case of formal agency adjudication] otherwise involving a de-
termination on the record after opportunity for a hearing."'123
The construction of the fifth category clearly suggests that Congress did
not intend to exempt only those meetings specifically concerned with ad-
judications conducted pursuant to § 554 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), 2 4 as described in Exemption 10's penultimate clause (item
(iv) above). In fact, the statute's language appears to suggest that Con-
gress intended that de facto formal adjudications 125 that "otherwise in-
volv[e] a determination on the record after opportunity for a hearing"
(item (v) above) should be exempt in addition to the § 554
adjudications. 26
123. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10) (1994). The corresponding ITC regulation closely tracks
the Act's language when it states:
(b) The Commission may close a portion or portions of a Commission meeting
only when it determines that public disclosure of information to be discussed at
such meeting is likely to:
(9) Specifically concern: (i) The Commission's issuance of a subpoena, (ii) the
Commission's participation in a civil action or proceeding, or (iii) the initiation,
conduct, or disposition by the Commission of a particular case of formal Commis-
sion adjudication under 19 U.S.C. 1337 pursuant to the procedures of 5 U.S.C.
554 or otherwise involving a determination on the record after opportunity for a
hearing.
19 C.F.R. § 201.36(b)(9) (1995).
In conducting AD/CVD investigations, the ITC is not required by statute or regulation
to comply with § 554 or any other section of the APA. 19 U.S.C. § 1677c(b); 19 C.F.R.
§ 207.23(b)(1995); see also infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (presenting support
for viewing AD/CVD investigations as formal adjudications for exemption purposes).
124. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (repealed 1966); Administrative Procedure
Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 381 (1966) (codified as amended in scattered sections'of 5
U.S.C.).
125. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing AD/CVD proceedings as
adjudications).
126. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10). While it is true that the phrase "on the record after oppor-
tunity for a hearing," is often used as a euphemism for proceedings that must be in compli-
ance with the APA, it is nonsensical to conclude that Congress intended that both the
1995]
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Clearly, Exemption 10 provides a distinction between adjudications
that fall under APA § 554 and those that involve "a determination on the
record after opportunity for a hearing.' 127
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals recognized this very
distinction between adjudications in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission .128 That court held that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission ("NRC"), pursuant to Exemption 10 of the Sunshine Act,
could properly close a portion of a meeting even though the relevant
NRC regulation did not expressly require on-the-record hearings pursu-
fourth and fifth categories in Exemption 10 should refer to meetings conducted under the
APA. Id. Rather, the use of the disjunctive "or" between each of the categories means
only that they sufficiently can be divided into separate and distinct alternatives. See supra
notes 123-26 and the accompanying text. The language of the ITC's own regulations
clearly supports this interpretation. See 19 C.F.R. § 201.36(b)(9). The relevant section of
the ITC regulations exempts meetings that "[s]pecifically concern ... the initiation, con-
duct, or disposition by the Commission of a particular case of formal Commission adjudica-
tion under 19 U.S.C. 1337 pursuant to the procedures of 5 U.S.C. 554 or otherwise
involving a determination on the record after opportunity for a hearing." 19 C.F.R.
§ 201.36(b)(9) (emphasis added). In the first phrase, the ITC regulation specifically identi-
fies ITC proceedings subject to the APA (so-called "Section 337" (19 U.S.C. § 1337) inter-
national intellectual property cases). See id. The second phrase, which follows the
disjunctive "or otherwise involving," covers those ITC proceedings that are not subject to
the APA but in substance resemble formal proceedings, such as AD/CVD proceedings.
See id.; see also Reform of the Sunshine Act, supra note 55, at 5 (noting that in addition to
adjudicative proceedings that are subject to § 554 of the APA and thus clearly within the
ambit of Exemption 10, the ITC also conducts adjudicative proceedings "which would ap-
pear to fit the definition by 'otherwise involving a determination on the record after an
opportunity for a hearing.' ").
127. 19 C.F.R. § 201.36(b)(9). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that the
last clause of Exemption 10 superficially appears to encompass a proceeding which, while
not required to comply with § 554 of the APA, is "a formal adjudication in the sense that
the Commission is conducting a full-scale on-the-record hearing." Philadelphia Newspa-
pers Inc. v. NRC, 727 F.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The ITC's AD/CVD hearing is
arguably such a "full-scale on-the-record" proceeding. See infra note 135 (discussing ITC
AD/CVD proceedings as "on-the-record"). The Philadelphia Newspapers court noted,
however, that such a conclusion would be hindered by the legislative history, which states
that the " 'otherwise involving a determination on the record' clause in Exemption 10 was
meant primarily to encompass formal rulemaking and not adjudication." 727 F.2d at 1202
(quoting H.R. RP. No. 880 (Part III), 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 9 (1976)); Time, Inc. v. United
States Postal Service, 667 F.2d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that the last clause of 5
U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10) is not solely limited to "adjudications" but also encompasses formal
rulemaking); see also Thomas, supra note 29, at 273-74 (discussing the Court's decision in
Time, Inc.). The Philadelphia Newspapers court implied, however, that the legislative his-
tory was not dispositive on the issue of how Exemption 10's last clause should be inter-
preted. 727 F.2d at 1202 n.3. Specifically, the court stated that they "need not decide the
difficult issue whether [the] second [i.e., last] clause covers proceedings other than formal
rulemaking ...." Id.
128. 727 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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ant to § 554 of the APA.1 2 9 The court stated that the Commission was
sufficiently and clearly conducting on the record proceedings according to
the formal procedural requirements set out by APA § 554.130 For exam-
ple, all of the Commissioners' decisions had to be based on the record
evidence, and ex parte contacts were prohibited.13' Therefore the court
held that the Sunshine Act did not apply to "what has in substance been a
Section 554 adjudication and [which is] thus functionally within Exemp-
tion 10.'132
Similarly, the ITC's AD/CVD proceedings fall squarely within the pa-
rameters set out by the Philadelphia Newspapers court. Specifically, AD/
CVD proceedings at the ITC involve a de facto formal agency adjudica-
tion which substantively complies with the requirements of § 554.'33 As
stated previously, § 554 requires a full-scale on-the-record hearing, 134 a
determination made pursuant to the record evidence,'35 and a fully docu-
129. Id. at 1203. The court found that the on-the-record proceeding fell substantively
within Exemption 10's penultimate § 554 clause. Id. at 1202 n.3; see supra notes 123-24
and accompanying text (discussing the five categories of Exemption 10).
130. Philadelphia Newspapers, 727 F.2d at 1203.
131. Id.
132. Id.; see also Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 617 F. Supp. 825,829-
30 (D.D.C. 1985) (finding that a meeting may satisfy Exemption 10 and be closed to the
scrutiny of the public eye even if it is not formally part of the adjudicatory process); Amrep
Corp. v. FTC, 768 F.2d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1985) (explaining that statutorily required
agency functions similar to a court's should be protected from disclosures as a court's
would be), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1034 (1986).
The Philadelphia Newspapers court specifically noted that the agency could close to the
public only those portions of the meeting that fell within the exemption, and not the entire
meeting. 727 F.2d at 1203-04.
133. Section 554 of the APA sets forth the formal procedures for all adjudication cases
that are required by statute to be determined on the record after an opportunity for a
hearing. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). Section 554 requires, for example, that an agency give notice of
the time, place, and nature of the hearings to all persons involved. Id. § 554(b)(1). Fur-
thermore, when time and public interest permit, all interested parties to the specific adjudi-
cation at bar must be given an opportunity to submit "facts, arguments, offers of
settlement, or proposals of adjustment" for consideration by the agency. Id. § 554(c)(1).
134. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). The AD/CVD statute requires that the Commission hold a
hearing during the course of an investigation upon request by any party to the investigation
prior to making final deliberations on the case. 19 U.S.C. § 1677c (1994). The ITC's own
regulations provide, more emphatically, that the ITC shall hold a hearing regarding an
investigation prior to a final determination. 19 C.F.R. § 207.23(a) (1995).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). Hearings and other proceedings related to the AD/CVD inves-
tigation are for all intents and purposes "on-the-record," since the regulations require that
"[a] verbatim transcript shall be made of all hearings or conferences held in connection
with Commission [AD/CVD] investigations ..." 19 C.F.R. § 207.23(c) (1995). The AD/
CVD statute and the ITC regulations have stringent requirements for maintenance of the
official record. The relevant ITC regulation, for example, states that the ITC secretary
"shall maintain the record of each [AD/CVD] investigation conducted by the Commission
..." and that "[aIll material properly filed with the Secretary shall be placed in the record."
19 C.F.R. § 207.4(a).
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mented recording of any ex parte contacts. 3 6 Philadelphia Newspapers
thus provides strong support for the assertion that portions of the Com-
mission's AD/CVD proceedings qualify for closure under Exemption 10's
penultimate clause, even if they fail under Exemption 10's final clause,"'
despite the fact that the proceedings are not required by law to comply
with § 554 of the APA.138
Regarding the question of whether AD/CVD proceedings are in fact
"adjudications" at all, Professors Jackson and Davey concluded in their
report to the United States Administrative Conference' 39 that the ITC's
AD/CVD proceedings are, in effect, formal adjudications.14 0 Jackson and
Davey noted that under the current structure of the Act, the ITC's role in
AD/CVD cases involves adjudicative as well as investigative responsibili-
ties.141 Specifically, the government weighs evidence, listens to the par-
ties' arguments, and makes a decision as to whether an injurious dumping
has occurred. 142 The legislative history to the 1979 Trade Agreements
Act lends further support to the argument that AD/CVD cases are de
facto adjudications.' 43 The Senate Report to the Trade Agreements Act
specifically states that even though the hearings in antidumping duty in-
vestigations are not subject to the APA, they still must be conducted to
allow full presentation of information and views.' 44
In sum, those portions of the ITC's informal and formal "meetings"
that "specifically concern" AD/CVD proceedings may be closed pursuant
136. The AD/CVD statute and ITC regulations both include a requirement that the
record of the proceeding include documentation of any ex parte meetings between inter-
ested parties and the Commission. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(a)(3) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 207.5
(1995).
137. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between
adjudications that fall under APA § 554 and those that involve a determination on the
record).
138. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
139. JACiKSON & DAVEY, supra note 4.
140. Id. at 31.
141. Id. Similarly, the Administrative Conference impliedly acknowledged the adjudi-
cative nature of the AD/CVD process when it stated: "given the conflicting positions of the
parties before the agencies-the domestic industry versus the foreign exporters-and their
role in supplying much of the information on which the agency decisions are based, the
parties do and should play an important part in the process." Recommendation, 56 Fed.
Reg. 67,144, 67,145 (1991); 1 C.F.R. pt. 305.91-10 (1977).
142. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 4, at 31.
143. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N.
381, 483 (discussing that AD/CVD hearings must be conducted so as to permit full presen-
tation of information and views). The AD/CVD statute gives the Commission the author-
ity to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, take depositions, and perform other
adjudicative-like functions. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(7) (1994).
144. S. REP. No. 249, at 97.
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to the Act's Exemption 10 and the ITC's own regulations.145 If the ITC
exercised its right affirmatively to close such meetings, Commissioners
would be encouraged to meet and talk with each other.146 It is axiomatic
that any discussion that might aid the Commissioners in these high-stakes
cases147 would be better than no discussion at all, as is currently the
case.
148
By holding informal face-to-face ,meetings, the ITC would encourage
more collegiality among its Commissioners, leading to greater frankness
and openness. 149 Permitting the Commissioners to engage in the open
exchange of information and ideas, free from the apprehension that
comes from knowing every utterance is subject to the white heat of close
public scrutiny, would decidedly improve the ITC's AD/CVD
decisionmaking.150
C. The ITC General Counsel's View
The Sunshine Act requires that for every meeting closed under one or
more of the exemptions of the Act's subsection (c), 151 the general counsel
or chief legal officer of the agency must certify that the meeting properly
may be closed.152 Therefore, the ITC general counsel's position on the
matters of what constitutes a "meeting" and when (if ever) Exemption 10
should apply is of critical importance.' 53
145. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10); 19 C.F.R. § 201.36(b)(9)(iii) (1995).
146. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that aside from the hearing
and the final vote, the Commissioners do not meet to discuss AD/CVD cases).
147. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (explaining the impact of AD/CVD
cases on the United States economy).
148. It is important to note that the Sunshine Act's procedural guideline requires that
any agency closing a meeting under Exemption 10 must maintain detailed minutes of the
meeting. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(f)(1). This safeguard assures that Commissioners will be held
accountable for their actions even if a meeting is closed. This compromise provides the
public with the fullest practicable information regarding the decisionmaking processes of
the Government, yet protects the ability of the Government to carry out its responsibilities
effectively. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the
Sunshine Act).
149. See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text (illustrating the way in which the
Sunshine Act has affected administrative agency decisionmaking).
150. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (explaining that people tend to act
differently when under pressure from the public and that this can adversely affect the deci-
sionmaking process).
151. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1-10) (delineating the 10 exemptions from the Sunshine
Act).
152. Id. § 552b(f)(1).
153. Since any action the Commission takes must be certified by the general counsel, it
is necessary to base any arguments in favor of closing the Commission's gatherings in the
context of how the general counsel, as well as the Commission itself, will view the situation.
See id. (elaborating on the duties of the general counsel when a meeting is closed).
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In the past, the Commission's general counsel took the position that
the Commissioners' meetings to dispose of AD/CVD cases did not fall
within Exemption 10.114 Today, however, it is uncertain what the general
counsel's position is regarding the status of informal background discus-
sions among Commissioners. Whether the general counsel considers
these discussions as "meetings" subject to the strictures of the Sunshine
Act,'155 and further, whether such meetings actually fall within the terms
of Exemption 10 is unclear.1
56
A 1984 ITC general counsel memorandum provides a context for how
the general counsel has approached this issue in the past.157 The ITC
drafted the 1984 memo in response to a Commission question concerning
whether a tour of domestic industry facilities by a majority of the Com-
mission would constitute a "meeting" under the Sunshine Act.158 The
154. Recommendation, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,144, 67,145 (1991).
155. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b (defining "meeting" and establishing guidelines explaining
when meetings must be open).
156. Since 1986, documents from the general counsel regarding internal procedures
have been interpreted to constitute privileged information, and as such are unavailable to
the public. Telephone Interview with Paul Bardos, ITC Administrative Attorney (Sept. 12,
1994). Attempts by the author to gain access to relevant post-1986 documents through the
Freedom of Information Act were unavailing.
The fact that the ITC promulgated regulations that are more strict than required by the
Sunshine Act may offer a clue in explaining the ITC general counsel's conservative inter-
pretation of the Act. For example, the Sunshine Act requires agencies to make public
announcement of a meeting at least one week before the meeting. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(e)(1).
The original ITC regulations, by contrast, specified that the ITC make public announce-
ment of a meeting at least 10 days prior to the meeting. 42 Fed. Reg. 11,241, 11,244 (Feb.
28, 1977); 19 C.F.R. § 201.35(a) (1977). The ITC only recently amended its regulations to
reduce the notice time to the statutorily-mandated seven days. 19 C.F.R. § 201.35(a)
(1995); Rules of General Application United States International Trade Commission, 1993
ITC LEXIS 570 (Sept. 14, 1993) (proposing the change from ten to seven days). In recom-
mending the change, the ITC general counsel stated, "[s]ince only a very few agencies
afford more than seven days' notice of meetings under the Act, the amendment is also in
accordance with the practice of most other agencies under the Act." Id. at *3. It is possi-
ble that the Commission made a conscious decision shortly after the Act's passage to go
beyond the requirements of the Act in an effort to portray the agency as an institution
committed from the outset to "openness." In short, perhaps the ITC's history of scrupu-
lous Sunshine Act compliance has had some effect on ITC general counsel's current con-
servative position.
This theory is bolstered by the September, 1995 testimony of Gracia Berg, former ITC
Deputy General Counsel, before the Administrative Conference Special Committee to Re-
view the Government in the Sunshine Act. Ms. Berg stated that the Chairman of the
Commission at the time of the Act's enactment was quite sensitive to criticism from Con-
gress and other quarters of the lack of openness in administrative agency proceedings.
Reform of the Sunshine Act, supra note 55, at 54.
157. Memorandum from the General Counsel to Commissioner Liebeler, 1984 ITC
GCM LEXIS 75 (May 18, 1984) (hereinafter General Counsel's Memorandum).
158. Id. at *1 (regarding the Commissioner's visits to the copper and tuna facilities).
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ITC general counsel concluded that the tour did not constitute a "meet-
ing" if the purpose of the trip was to obtain background information on
the operations and conditions of the industry, and not to decide the mer-
its of the case. 159 The memo discussed at some length the Administrative
Conference's Interpretive Guide160 and the Supreme Court's ITT deci-
sion 161 to support its conclusion that general discussions between Com-
missioners, as well as those "between Commissioners and other parties
that may occur during the upcoming trip would not violate the Sunshine
Act. "162
Based on this memo, it would seem that the ITC general counsel could
be convinced that it is possible for the Commissioners to engage in pri-
vate informal background discussions that clarify issues and expose vary-
ing views without violating the Sunshine Act. For unknown reasons, 6 3
however, the general counsel's memo has not prompted the Commission
or Commissioners to engage in such discussions, much to the detriment of
the Commission's AD/CVD decisionmaking.' 4
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Under its current practice in deciding antidumping and countervailing
duty cases, the Commissioners at the United States International Trade
Commission do not engage in private informal background discussions
due to concerns that such discussions violate the Sunshine Act. This prac-
tice significantly compromises the Commission's ability to carry out its
159. Id. at *1-2.
160. BERG & KLITZMAN, supra note 29.
161. FCC v. ITT World Communication, Inc. 466 U.S. 463 (1984); see supra notes 79-92
and accompanying text (discussing the ITT decision). The 1984 memo cites the same lan-
guage from the Senate Report as the Supreme Court did in ITT. It specifically stated that
" '[Informal] background discussions [that] clarify issues and expose varying views' are a
necessary part of an agency's work." General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 157, at
*9 (alterations in original).
162. General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 157, at *11.
163. Either the general counsel's position has changed significantly since the 1984
memo or the Commissioners themselves have declined to risk the possibly of "meeting" in
violation of the Sunshine Act. Again, it is impossible to know the precise reason for the
Commission's position on this matter because attempts to gain access to the general coun-
sel's privileged documents through the Freedom of Information Act were unavailing. See
supra note 156.
164. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (explaining the consequences on the
nation's economy from undesirable outcomes in AD/CVD cases due to non-communica-
tion among decisionmakers). The Commission's practice, at the very least, creates the per-
ception that the Commission is not doing all that it can to produce well-reasoned,
thoughtful, and fair AD/CVD decisions. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing trade law practitioners' views of the Commission's lack of communication).
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responsibilities effectively. 165 By essentially preventing the Commission-
ers access to a substantial portion of the resources available in these
cases, including the knowledge and insights of the other individual Com-
missioners, the ITC produces AD/CVD decisions that are less well-rea-
soned, thoughtful, and fair than they might otherwise be. Such a practice
is particularly troublesome given the high stakes and costs involved in
AD/CVD cases.
The plain language and legislative history of the Sunshine Act, together
with highly persuasive Supreme Court and academic authority, strongly
suggest that private informal background discussions by the Commission-
ers would not constitute "meetings" violative of the Sunshine Act.1 66 As
long as the ITC's proceedings remain informal, in that they do not "effec-
tively predetermine official actions," or cause the individual Commission-
ers to form "reasonably firm positions" regarding pending AD/CVD
cases, the Commission may and should engage in private informal back-
ground discussions to clarify issues and expose varying views. Even in the
unlikely event that such informal discussions are "meetings" subject to
the Sunshine Act, a careful reading of the statute, together with the ITC's
own regulations and persuasive case authority, suggests that those por-
tions of meetings that "specifically concern" AD/CVD proceedings fall
within the Act's Exemption 10. Thus, the ITC would be permitted to
exempt those proceedings from the Act's open meeting requirement.
The ITC should reconsider its overly restrictive interpretation of the
Sunshine Act and revise its policy to allow its Commissioners to engage in
private informal background discussions among themselves. Moreover,
the ITC should exercise its right affirmatively to close those portions of
formal meetings that "specifically concern" AD/CVD proceedings under
the Act's exemptions. The benefits of such a change in policy would be
significant. First, it would encourage the Commissioners to meet amongst
themselves. Any discussion among the ultimate decisionmakers regard-
ing issues in high-stakes AD/CVD cases is better than no discussion at all.
Second, it would allow the Commissioners to ask questions, brainstorm,
and float innovative ideas out of the unblinking scrutiny of the public eye.
In sum, by promoting and encouraging the open exchange of information
and ideas, this basic change in policy would significantly aid the ITC in
achieving its goal of producing well-reasoned, thoughtful, and fair AD/
CVD decisions.
165. See supra notes 6, 14, and accompanying text (explaining how the Act causes non-
communication between Commissioners, and consequently, undesirable outcomes in AD/
CVD cases).
166. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes a "meet-
ing" under the Sunshine Act).
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